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Defending Courts: A Brief Rejoinder to Professors 
Fried and Rosenberg 
David C. Vladeck' 
Harvard Professors David Rosenberg and Charles Fried have presented a 
provocative, sweeping critique of the theoretical foundations of tort liability 
that leaves virtually no aspect of our current tort system untouched, or perhaps 
more accurately, unscathed. Their article throws down the gauntlet to 
defenders of traditional tort law. For instance, Rosenberg and Fried take aim 
at the jury system, arguing that ex post liability rules created by juries are 
inefficient and should be replaced, whenever possible, by ex ante liability 
rules set by legislative bodies.! And they attack the idea that compensation 
plays a legitimate role in structuring our tort system. In their view, in this era 
of near-universal access to insurance, deterrence is the only legitimate basis 
for creating rules of liability? 
Despite my trepidation in picking up the gauntlet and doing battle with 
two eminent scholars, I take issue with much of their thesis, so much so that I 
began my oral remarks by saying "so much to disagree with, so little time." 
But I was not asked to engage in a point-by-point debate over theory. Nor 
was I called upon to challenge their view that the widespread availability of 
insurance somehow justifies dispensing with concerns over compensation in 
setting liability rules. 
Rather, I was asked to comment briefly on their article. With that task in 
mind, I want to explore the central question posed in Rosenberg and Fried's 
article, namely, which institution of government ought to have the principle 
responsibility for setting rules governing liability for accidents and product 
defects? Should it be the courts, through jury determinations? Or should it be 
legislative bodies, through legislation or the delegation of decisional authority 
to administrative agencies? Rosenberg and Fried argue at length that courts 
are poorly suited to establish liability rules, and they cite a variety of reasons 
to support their conclusion that, ideally, the rule-setting task should be the 
Director, Public Citizen Litigation Group; Adjunct Professor of Law, Georgetown 
University Law Center 
! Charles Fried & David Rosenberg, Presentation, 31 SETON HALL L. REv. 625 (200 I). 
2 !d. at 629. 
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province of legislative bodies.3 In their view, information is the sine qua non 
of efficient standard setting.4 What tips the balance against the courts, 
Rosenberg and Fried argue, is the inherent advantage legislatures and 
administrative agencies have in gathering relevant information.5 
Measured by the information-gathering resources available today to 
Congress, regulatory agencies, and the courts, Rosenberg and Fried have it 
backwards. Courts are much better equipped to gather and assess 
information. The civil discovery process gives litigants broad access to 
information. Parties in litigation tend to be highly motivated to discover any 
information that may aid their cause, and the adversary process enables parties 
to test the reliability of the information they acquire. Furthermore, judges and 
juries have a wide array of resources available to assist them in sifting and 
evaluating even the most complex scientific or technical information. 
Congress, on the other hand, is institutionally hamstrung in engaging in 
the systematic acquisition of information. For one thing, it is wrong to think 
of Congress as a monolithic institution. It is not. It is a collection of dozens 
of committees in both Houses, each of which operates largely as an 
independent fiefdom, with its own leadership, staff, and priorities. Rarely is 
there sustained coordination between committees in information gathering.6 
There is no central repository for the information that congressional 
committees compile, so multiple committees often plow the same ground 
without access to the work-product generated by their counterparts. 
Individual members have no right of access to Executive Branch records and 
no authority to compel non-governmental bodies to provide information.7 
Although most congressional committees have subpoena authority, subpoenas 
3 Id. 
4 !d. at 629-30. 
5 Id. at 630. 
6 See generally HOUSE RULES COMM., CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT: A "How-To" 
SERIES OF WORKSHOPS, Conducted by the Congressional Research Service (Comm. Print 
1999). Indeed, even in the most high-profile situations, it appears that there is little 
coordination between committees. See, e.g., Senate Select Comm. on Presidential 
Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 732 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc) (denying the 
Senate Select Committee's motion to enforce its subpoena for certain Nixon tape recordings 
on the ground, among others, that the request was cumulative inasmuch as the same matter 
was under investigation by the House Judiciary Committee, which had already obtained 
copies of each of the tapes sought by the Senate Committee). 
7 See, e.g., Leach v. Resolution Trust Corp., 860 F. Supp. 868 (D.D.C. 1994) (rejecting 
Congressman Leach's effort to obtain access to information relating to a failed savings and 
loan); Lee v. Kelley, 99 F.R.D. 340 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd sub nom., S. Christian Leadership 
Conference v. Kelley, 747 F.2d 777 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (rejecting Senator Helms' effort to 
intervene in litigation to gain access to information); see also DAVID KESSLER, A QUEsrrON 
OF INTENT: A GREAT BATTLE WITH A DEADLY INDUSTRY 154, 289 (public Affairs 2001) 
(former FDA Commissioner noting that on occasion he directed his staff to ignore 
congressional demands for information relating to the FDA's investigation of the tobacco 
industry). 
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may generally be issued only by the committee chair or by a majority 
committee vote, and they are notoriously difficult to enforce.s Even when a 
congressional committee receives information, the committee has no means to 
verify the information's accuracy and congressional staffs frequently lack the 
expertise to evaluate complex or technical information. 
Administrative agencies are also severely limited in their information-
gathering ability. Most significantly, many agencies have no subpoena power 
and therefore cannot compel the submission of records or the testimony of 
outsiders.9 The Paperwork Reduction ActIO also places very strict limitations 
on the information gathering ability of agencies. Agencies may not even send 
surveys to ten or more regulated entities without first securing the permission 
of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs at the Office of 
Management and Budget. Most agencies have small staffs, which further 
hampers their ability to engage in substantial information-gathering activities, 
particularly on mUltiple fronts. The FDA, which is responsible for regulating 
one-quarter of the American economy, employs fewer than 10,000 people 
S Congressional subpoenas are to be enforced pursuant to the procedures laid out in 2 
U.S.c. § 192 (1994), which requires that civil or criminal contempt proceedings be brought 
to compel a recalcitrant witness to testify or to tum over records. See also id. § 194 
(establishing a procedure by which Congress may refer contempt cases to United States 
Attorneys, who, of course, are part of the Executive Branch). There is a statute nominally 
authorizing the Senate to bring litigation to enforce its own subpoenas, 2 U.S.c. § 288d 
(1994), but the validity of that authorization has yet to be tested in court. Not surprisingly, 
only a handful of contempt proceedings have been brought under these provisions. There is 
also a statute requiring executive agencies, on request of any five members of the Senate 
Committee on Government Affairs or any seven members of the House Committee on 
Government Reform, to submit information, so long as the information relates "to any 
matter within the jurisdiction of the committee." 5 U.S.C. § 2954. The executive branch 
has long contended that this provision is not enforceable. See, e.g, Executive Privilege, 
Secrecy in Government: Hearings on S. 2170, S. 2378, S. 2420 Before the Subcomm. on 
Intergovernmental Relations of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 94th Congo 
116-17 (1975) (statement of Antonin Scalia, Assistant Attorney General). Litigation is 
underway by 16 members of the House Committee on Government Reform to test the 
enforceability of this provision. Waxman V. Evans, Civ. Action No. 01-04530 (LGB) (C.D. 
Ca1.). 
9 The FDA, for instance, has no subpoena authority. Although the agency does have 
the power to examine business records during the course of a factory inspection, 21 U.S.c. § 
374 (1994), that power is highly circumscribed (for example, it does not reach third parties) 
and is not a substitute for subpoena authority. See KESSLER, supra note 7, at 235 (observing 
that the tobacco industry was able to hobble the FDA's investigation into its practice of 
manipulating the nicotine levels in cigarettes because the FDA could not subpoena industry 
documents or compel the testimony of industry employees and consultants). 
\0 44 U.S.C. § 3501 (1994). Although the stated purpose of the Paperwork Reduction 
Act is to minimize the paperwork burden the federal government imposed on individuals 
and small businesses and to increase efficiency within the federal government, id., it seeks 
to achieve those goals by placing strict limits on the ability of agencies to acquire 
information. See 44 U.S.C. §§ 3507, 3508 (1994). 
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nationwide. I I These employees are responsible, among other things, for 
inspecting virtually all non-meat food products sold in this country, including 
imports; reviewing new drug applications; evaluating the safety of medical 
devices; and overseeing the safety of the blood supply, veterinary medicines, 
and cosmetics. 12 
One way to test the validity of the proposition that the courts are better 
positioned to gather and assess infonnation is to examine the Tobacco Wars 
of the 1990s-battles waged before Congress, the FDA, and in the courts-
and ask: "Which institution did a better job of collecting and assessing 
infonnation?" The answer is clear-it was the courts. 
Consider first Congress' investigation, which was carried out mainly by 
the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, House Committee on 
Energy and Commerce. Under the leadership of Democrat Congressman 
Henry Waxman, the Subcommittee began looking into the health risks posed 
by tobacco use in the early 1990s and held a series of hearings on the 
regulation of tobacco products in 1994.\3 The Subcommittee also sought and 
obtained some documents from the industry, and other documents were 
provided by industry whistle-blowers and by trial lawyers who had obtained 
industry documents through discovery. As a result of the 1994 election, 
control of the House shifted to the Republicans, and the leadership of the 
Subcommittee fell to Tom Bliley, the fonner Mayor of Richmond, Virginia 
(home to Philip Morris) and ardent defender of the tobacco industry. Not 
surprisingly, the Subcommittee's investigation ceased at that point, and all the 
Subcommittee had to show for its efforts was the publication of its hearings 
and the release of several thousand industry documents. 14 
11 See http://www.fda.gov/opacomlfaq/faw.html (last visited Apr. II, 2001) (reporting 
that the FDA has "more than 9,000 employees"). 
12 See id.; see also 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-1908 (1994). 
13 Regulation of Tobacco Products (Part 1), Hearings Before Subcomm. on Health and 
the Environment, House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong., (1994), available at 
1994 WL 226262 (F.D.C.H.). 
14 Congress addressed the liability questions relating to the tobacco industry again in 
1997-98, this time as part of its review of a proposed agreement negotiated by the tobacco 
industry and State Attorneys General, which the parties sought to have Congress impose 
through legislation. The agreement would have required the tobacco industry to pay 
substantial sums to the states as reimbursement for tobacco-related health care expenditures. 
In exchange, the tobacco industry would have received immunity from certain forms of civil 
liability. A number of congressional committees held hearings to assess the wisdom of the 
settlement. See, e.g., First Amendment Implications of Regulating the Advertising and 
Promotion of Tobacco Products to Children and Adolescents, Hearing Before the Senate 
Judiciary Comm., 105th Congo (1998), available at 1998 WL 244802 (F.D.C.H.); Hearings 
on the Tobacco Settlement, Hearing Before the Senate Commerce Comm., 105th Cong., 
(1997), available at 1997 WL 757507 (F.D.C.H). No effort was made, however, by the 
committees to coordinate the compilation of information, let alone assemble it in a central 
repository accessible to all staff. Ultimately, Congress deadlocked on the legislation and 
none was enacted. 
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Consider next the FDA's tobacco investigation, which ran from 1993 to 
1996. As noted, the FDA is typical of administrative agencies. It has no 
subpoena authority and thus must depend on cooperation, not compulsion, in 
gathering information. Its investigation into the tobacco industry underscores 
the inefficiencies in such an approach. The tobacco industry repeatedly 
ignored FDA efforts to obtain information, witnesses routinely refused to 
cooperate with FDA investigators, and it appears that at least on one occasion, 
a company's personnel deliberately misled the FDA about the company's 
development and use of tobacco plants genetically engineered to increase 
their nicotine content. IS Tellingly, in his recent book, A Question of Intent, 
former FDA Commissioner David Kessler relies heavily on evidence obtained 
in litigation to make his case that the tobacco industry deceived Congress, 
regulators, and the American people about the addictive nature of its products 
and its ability to manipulate the nicotine dose delivered by cigarettes to 
maintain addiction.16 His book chronicles the severe information-gathering 
limitations that hampered the FDA's investigation from start to finish. 
Contrast this with the tobacco litigation efforts in the various lawsuits 
brought against the industry by state attorneys general, often with the 
assistance of private counsel. In Minnesota, for example, lawyers 
representing the state gathered, reviewed, and ultimately made public over 12 
million pages of tobacco industry records, many of which had initially been 
designated as privileged by the industry.17 They had no problem getting 
subpoenas. In fact, tidal waves of subpoenas were issued and enforced. They 
had no difficulty in getting claims of privilege adjudicated because the state 
court stood ready to referee discovery disputes between the parties. And the 
plaintiffs were able to assimilate efficiently the mountains of documents they 
acquired because they were highly motivated litigants who had, literally, 
armies of lawyers, paralegals, scientists, and other experts to review 
documents, and computer experts to place the documents in a searchable 
15 KESSLER, supra note 7, at 228, 234, and 242-44. 
16 See generally id. 
17 Professor Rosenberg suggests that, because I see significant advantages in the data-
gathering resources available in litigation, I favor privatization in the context of data 
acquisition. That suggestion is mystifying, especially in the context of the Minnesota 
litigation, where the plaintiff was a state government, not a private party. But Professor 
Rosenberg's suggestion is off base for a more fundamental reason: Information generated in 
litigation is public information and the courts have, almost without exception, recognized a 
broad right of nonparties to intervene in litigation to obtain records exchanged in discovery. 
See. e.g., Jessup v. Luther, 227 F.3d 993, 997 (7th Cir. 2000); E.E.O.C. v. Nat'l Children's 
Ctr., Inc., 146 F.3d 1042, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing supporting cases from nine circuits); 
United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1047 (2d Cir. 1995); Public Citizen v. Liggett 
Group, Inc., 858 F.2d 775, 783-84 (1st Cir. 1988) (permitting intervention of public health 
organizations interested solely in obtaining access to documents concerning the safety of 
cigarettes); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 141 (2d CiT. 1987). 
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database. The infonnation developed as a result of that litigation remains the 
largest and most comprehensive repository of information relating to the 
tobacco industry in the world, and it is available on line to scholars, 
regulators, prospective tobacco plaintiffs and anyone else who cares to review 
it.'s I could go on. But as this illustration makes clear, in tenns of 
institutional competence, the court system has substantial advantages over any 
other government institution in gathering and assessing data.'9 
This point is further confirmed by the controversy over the safety of 
silicone gel breast implants. In 1976, Congress enacted the Medical Device 
Amendments20 to the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act?' Part of that 
law required manufacturers of medical devices on the market in 1976 to 
submit health and safety data to the federal government that showed the 
device was safe for its intended use?2 In May 1990, the government called 
for the makers of breast implants to provide safety information for their 
products. It was not produced. After giving the implant manufacturers 
several extensions, the FDA ultimately withdrew silicone breast implants 
from the market. The agency took that drastic step, not because there was 
evidence proving them to be unsafe (although there was considerable 
18 See, e.g., http://www.tobaccodocuments.com (last visited Apr. II, 2001); 
http://www.Ijrtdocs.com(lastvisitedApr.ll. 2001). 
19 Admittedly, protective orders are often used in litigation to shield from the public 
documents that might shed light on public health controversies. Indeed, in the early rounds 
of the tobacco litigation, the industry effectively concealed its information by insisting on 
the entry of broad protective orders that kept much of the most damning evidence from 
public view. See Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 140 F.R.D. 681 (D.N.!. 1992) (proclaiming 
the industry the "king of concealment and disinformation," in its effort to keep over 1 ,500 
industry records secret and finding that the crime/fraud exception might justify denying the 
industry'S attorney-client privilege claims), vacated, 975 F.3d 81 (3d Cir. 1992). Yet, as is 
often true in high-stakes public health litigation, the industry's effort to hide this material 
failed in the long run, with courts ultimately rejecting privilege claims and requiring the 
public release of virtually all of the industry's documents. 
20 21 U.S.C. §§ 35 I-360m (1994). 
21 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1994). 
22 Medical devices are classified under the Act depending on the likely safety 
consequences of their use; because they were intended to be implanted in the body, breast 
implants were classified as Category III devices (devices which are to be used "in 
supporting or sustaining human life," "in preventing impairment of human health," or which 
"present[] a potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury." 21 U.S.c. § 360c(a)(C)( 1 )(ii) 
(1994). Manufacturers of Class III devices must be able to demonstrate that their device 
provides "a reasonable assurance of ... safety and effectiveness" for its intended use. !d. 
For devices on the market at the time the Medical Device Amendments became effective, 
the Act directs the FDA to engage in a rulemaking to establish appropriate standards for the 
device. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b) (1994). At the outset of the rulemaking process, the FDA 
called for the submission of data demonstrating that the device meets the "reasonable 
assurance of safety and effectiveness standard." !d. The FDA published a proposed rule 
calling for the submission of the data on May 17,1990. 55 Fed. Reg. 20,568 (May 17, 
1990). See generally Teich v. FDA, 7S 1 F. Supp. 243 (D.D.C. 1990) (recounting the FDA's 
effort to compel breast implant manufacturers to submit safety data to the FDA). 
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evidence raising safety concerns), but because the industry had failed to obey 
the law and submit evidence showing that the implants did not pose an 
unreasonable risk when used as intended. 23 
Now, fast-forward to the multi-district litigation over breast implant 
safety that was consolidated before Judge Pointer/4 the respectec,i jurist who 
authored the Manual on Complex Litigation (Second). To assess the 
plaintiffs' claims that implants were responsible for a range of immune and 
connective tissue disorders, Judge Pointer appointed a panel of scientific 
experts to conduct a massive epidemiological study of the safety of implants. 
The scientific panel reported that, although breast implants showed serious 
problems with breakage, leakage, and capsular contraction/5 the evidence did 
not support a clear link between the widely feared immune and connective 
disorders and the devices?6 Some may question the scientific panel's 
findings. But there can be no dispute that, in this case, the court achieved in 
the span of a couple of years an information-gathering process that the FDA 
could not accomplish for most of a decade. If one looks at the kinds of tort 
cases on which Professors Rosenberg and Fried focus-accident and product 
defect cases-it is hard to argue that any governmental institution other than 
the court system is capable of dealing with these matters in a systematic, 
sustained, and organized way. 
That conclusion also undercuts Professor Rosenberg and Fried's 
argument in favor of regulatory preemption. Professors Fried and Rosenberg 
23 See Across the Nation, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Aug. 24, 1991, at A2. The San 
Diego Tribune reported that Bristol Meyers-Squibb was required to remove its silicone gel 
breast implants from the market because the company failed to comply with the FDA's 
request for information about the implants' safety. Id.; see also Bruce Ingersoll, Bioplasty 
Drops Silicone Implants After FDA Questions Safety Data, WALL ST. 1., Mar. 6, 1992, at 
B 12 (reporting implant manufacturer's removal of breast implants after non-compliance 
with FDA requirements). 
24 See In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 996 F. Supp. 1110 (N.D. 
Ala. 1997). 
25 Id. at 1115. 
26 In the early 1990s, some scientists reported that silicone breast implants could cause a 
serious autoimmune disorder in recipients. See, e.g., Researcher Says Breast Implants May 
Be Linked to Autoimmune Disease, CANCER WEEKLY, Dec. 21, 1992, at 16. Others reported 
a high incidence of rupture, running as high as thirty percent at five years, fifty percent at 
ten years, and seventy percent at seventeen years. I.S. Marotta et aI., Silicone Gel Breast 
Implant Failure and Frequency of Additional Surgeries: Analysis of 35 Studies Reporting 
Examination of More Than 8,000 Explants, 1. BIOMED. MATERIALS REs. 48(3):354-64 
(1999). In 1999, however, a study by the National Academy of Sciences' Institute of 
Medicine did not find a greater risk of chronic illness in women with silicone implants. 
Reuters, Study Finds Little Evidence that Silicone Breast Implants are Linked to Disease, 
CHI. TRIB., Mar. 28, 2001, available at 2001 WL 4056283. The Institute's report is 
available at http://www.nap.eduibooksl030906532Ilhtrnl/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2001); see 
also B.G. Silverman et aI., Reported Complications of Silicone Gel Breast Implants: An 
Epidemiologic Review, ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 124(8):744-56 (Apr. 15, 1996). 
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quite wrongly, in my view, use automobile safety as an example to illustrate 
their proposition that compliance with specific federal regulatory 
requirements should generally preempt tort remedies?? The history of 
standard setting by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(NHTSA) s~ggests that the confidence Professors Rosenberg and Fried place 
in the agency is not well founded. 
To take one example, consider NHTSA's regulation of automobile 
fuel systems. Recently, there have been a number of high-profile cases 
involving car accidents leading to fires. In these accidents, cars collided, 
either with another car or a stationary object, their fuel systems ruptured, 
and serious fuel-fed fires occurred. People were killed or seriously 
maimed. One might ask why effective regulation has not reduced the 
incidence of these catastrophic accidents. The answer is as simple as it is 
grim. NHTSA' s fuel system safety standard28 is at least three decades out 
of date: It is the same standard that governed General Services 
Administration automobile purchases in 1967. The standard requires that a 
car be able to sustain certain impacts from the rear, the front, and the side, 
without rupturing the fuel tank.29 NHTSA adopted the standard shortly 
after the agency was created in 1966. NHTSA has not changed this 
standard despite enormous technological strides in upgrading fuel system 
safety. In 1991, NHTSA conducted a study of the safety of fuel systems 
and found that cars on the road then were every bit as likely to sustain fuel 
tank ruptures as they were in 1967.30 In fact, the standard has had no 
impact at all on the death and injury rate since 1967. 
27 The Supreme Court has accepted regulatory preemption arguments with regarding to 
automobile safety standards issued by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
only where there was strong evidence of an intent by the agency to preempt inconsistent 
state law. Compare Geier v. American Honda Motor, Inc., 529 U.S. 861 (2000), with 
Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995). See also Robert L. Rabin, Reassessing 
Regulatory Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2049 (2000). 
28 49 C.F.R. § 571.301 (1999). The automobile safety provision states that "[t]he 
purpose of this standard is to reduce deaths and injuries occurring from fires that result from 
fuel spillage during and after motor vehicle crashes .... " !d. 
29 [d. at S5-S6.6 (setting forth crashworthiness requirements for specific vehicles). 
30 See Barry Meier, Officials Did Little, Despite Report Saying Us. Rule Wasn't 
Cutting Fatal Car Fires, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21,1992, at A7. Meier wrote: 
Standards on fire safety were first issued in 1967 and extended to pickups a 
decade later. The 1990 study, which the agency published in early 1991, 
compared the safety records of vehicles built before and after the standard. It 
concluded that the standard had reduced car fires by about 14 percent but that 
it did not find a decline in fire-related car deaths. The report noted that fire 
deaths might remain constant, even while overall fires declined, if the 
fatalities occurred in crashes above the speeds covered by the standard. 
[d.; see also GM's Fuel-Tank Problems May Lead to Rule Changes, ORLANDO SENTINEL 
TRIB., Dec. 3, 1992, at G4 (stating that because of controversy surrounding faulty fuel tanks 
in General Motors automobiles, "the agency may have to beef-up safety rules as a result"). 
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Why is this standard so lax? There are a number of reasons. One is 
that the automobile industry has fought tooth and nail against upgrading 
safety standards, even in the face of NHTSA' s concerted effort during the 
1990s to modernize its outmoded standards. NHTSA faces a fonnidable 
challenge in doing battle with the automobile industry because it is so 
profoundly outmatched. NHTSA has a skeletal staff, numbering fewer 
than 1,000 employees.3! It has a tiny research budget. It is one "David" 
facing many Goliaths. For these reasons, it has to be very selective in the 
fights it takes on.32 
Another reason the 1967 standard remains intact has to do with politics. 
Like every other federal agency, NHTSA is subjected to political pressure that 
is often irresistible. For example, NHTSA's earliest effort to phase in the use 
of air bags in automobiles was thwarted by the lobbying effort of Chrysler 
head Lee Iacocca and Ford chairman, Henry Ford II. When NHTSA first 
announced the introduction of air bags, Iacocca and Ford went to see 
President Nixon to complain, arguing that the requirement would hurt Detroit 
and help Japanese automakers.33 Immediately after the meeting, Nixon called 
Secretary of Transportation John Volpe and told him to rescind the rule, 
which he did.34 The conversation between Nixon and Iacocca and Ford is 
included in the newly released collection of the Nixon audiotapes. 
Admittedly, few rules are subject to the kind of political pressures that 
delayed the introduction of airbags. But the rulemaking process has 
become highly political over the past decade or so, with interventions 
coming subtly and generally secretly-through the Office of Management 
and Budget, the Council on Competitiveness, or the Quayle Council--or 
31 See WILLIAM F. FUNK ET AL. , ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE: PROBLEMS 
& CASES 9 (2d ed. 2001) (reporting that NHTSA had 913 employees). 
32 In its decision finding that, in response to industry pressure NHTSA had improperly 
rescinded a regulation requiring the phase-in of air bags, the Supreme Court noted that 
"[t]or nearly a decade, the automobile industry waged the regulatory equivalent of war 
against the airbag." Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 
29, 49 (1983). The fight against airbags is not the only "war" the industry has waged 
against NHTSA standards. 
33 See New Tape: Ford Co. Officials Pressed Nixon on Air-Bag Rules, UNITED PRESS 
INT'L, Nov. 28, 1992. United Press International reported: 
!d. 
Two top Ford Motor Co. executives [Henry Ford II and Lee Iacocca] met 
secretly with President Richard Nixon in 1971 in an apparently successful 
effort to quash federal regulations that would have put air bags in every new 
car sold in the United States, it was reported Monday. The Los Angeles 
Times report, based on a long-sought White House tape, said the pending 
rule, which would have required airbags in every new car from 1973 on, was 
rescinded by the Department of Transportation shortly after the meeting. 
34 [d. 
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overtly through proposed appropriations riders that restrict the agency's 
rulemaking power or punish an agency for daring to take on an industry.35 
As the airbag example illustrates, there are sound reasons why the tort 
and regulatory systems operate in tandem and place separate, albeit 
reinforcing, disciplines on the market. When functioning well, a regulatory 
system prevents injury. But the tort system is vital because far too often 
there are gaps that our regulatory agencies fail to fill. Perhaps in a perfect 
world one could expect our regulatory agencies to have immediate access 
to data enabling them to pinpoint problems and solve them; in that case, the 
regulatory preemption argument advanced by Professors Rosenberg and 
Fried might have more force. But that would be a world where agencies 
never lack the personnel, technical data, and other resources needed to deal 
with emerging safety hazards; where regulations are issued once the agency 
identifies a problem requiring a solution; where rules are updated swiftly to 
reflect design changes (as in the automotive industry), technological 
advances or scientific knowledge; and where regulatory decisions are made 
by politically insulated agencies, free from untoward pressure from 
congressional committees and powerful industry lobbyists. That may be 
the world as seen by Professors Rosenberg and Fried; it is not the world as 
seen by those of us who routinely work with regulatory agencies. 36 
Thus far, I have limited my comments to responding to the thesis 
developed by Professors Rosenberg and Fried that legislatures and regulatory 
agencies should carry the laboring oar in setting liability standards. I have 
tried to explain that the authors' arguments regarding the superior institutional 
competence of those bodies to gather and evaluate information in a timely and 
unbiased way are highly contestable, if not demonstrably wrong. I want to 
35 See, e.g., Neal E. Devins, Regulation oj Government Agencies Through Limitation 
Riders, 1987 DUKE L.J. 456; Thomas O. McGarity, Presidential Control oj Agency 
Decisionmaking, 36 AM. U. L. REv. 443, 456 (1987); Mark Seidenfeld, A Big Picture 
Approach to Presidential Influence on Agency Policy-Making, 80 IOWA L. REv. I (1994); 
see also KESSLER, supra note 7, at 316-17 (describing the tobacco industry's successful 
retribution against the FDA by killing the agency's urgently needed appropriation for a 
facility in which to consolidate the agency's dispersed work-force). 
36 A page of history often speaks volumes, and history offers a cautionary tale that 
illustrates the hazards of using regulatory standards alone to define an acceptable level of 
public safety. When the Titanic set sail on its maiden and final voyage in April 1912, it 
carried 2227 passengers and crew; 1494 died after the ship hit an iceberg and sank. The 
Titanic carried 16 lifeboats with room for 980 people, thus satisfying (in fact exceeding) the 
then-current maritime safety regulations set by the British Board of Trade. The Board of 
Trade's standard had been set in 1884, when the largest vessel afloat was approximately 
one-quarter the size of the Titanic and other, new "super liners" such as the Lusitania and 
Mauretania, which carried far more passengers than their predecessors. The Board of Trade 
was not oblivious to this development; in fact, an advisory committee met in 1911 to discuss 
the standard, but did not take action. A year later nearly 1500 perished. See JOHN P. 
EASTON & CHARLES A. HASS, TITANIC: DESTTNATION DISASTER 113-13 (1987); JOHN 
DunMAN, THE SINKING OF THE TITANIC I3 (1988). 
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end, however, by explaining briefly the vital importance of having courts and 
juries playa role in forging the rules of tort liability. 
There is a collective concern within the legal profession-given voice 
by Professors Rosenberg and Fried-about the legitimacy of the roles of the 
judge and jury in determining liability rules. After all, critics argue, what 
sense does it make to hand a small group of people the power to make liability 
rules that often have a broad application beyond the controversy before the 
court? 
The answer, in my view, stems in part from the fact that the jury system 
is the purest democratic institution we have. There are no proxies in jury 
rooms. When a person sits in a jury room, his or her voice carries greater 
force than in any other setting or forum in our representative democracy. If a 
properly constituted jury determines that an automobile manufacturer's failure 
to upgrade its fuel system to prevent ruptures in low-speed crashes is 
indefensible and should form the basis of a liability determination, so be it. 
Juries have served that function in the United States for more than two 
centuries. Why is Congress, or NHTSA for that matter, better equipped to 
make that decision? Surely, Professors Rosenberg and Fried have no 
expectation that Congress would or should legislate to that level of detail. 
And, as I have explained, surrendering that authority to an embattled and 
undermanned regulatory agency like NHTSA is indefensible. It seems to me 
that the American people have a right to shape liability rules that, in the end, 
they pay for, and the jury plays a pivotal role in creating these rules. 
Critics of the common-law process often attack the jury system and 
quite deliberately overlook the gate-keeping function played by judges. 
They speak of runaway juries and attack the democratic underpinnings of 
the jury system. This view is myopic. Juries have no roving commission 
to do as they see fit. The proposition that juries are untethered and 
unaccountable is untenable. After all, cases are not submitted to juries 
unless a judge has concluded that there is a legal theory that may give rise 
to liability. The interaction between judge and jury is one of the strengths 
of the common-law system, as well as a powerful check on any excess or 
abuse.37 Consider Judge Cardozo's landmark opinion for the New York 
37 Critics of the civil justice system, like Professors Rosenberg and Fried, have long 
argued that reform is needed to stem the tide of runaway damage verdicts by juries. But 
empirical evidence does not support their thesis that juries behave irrationality. According 
to a recent report in the New York Times, a comprehensive empirical study soon to be 
published in the Cornell Law Review confirms that juries do not behave markedly different 
from judges in awarding punitive damages-a finding that runs directly counter to 
Rosenberg and Fried's argument. William Glaberson, A Study's Verdict: Jury Awards Are 
Not Out of Control, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2001, at A3 (reporting that both judges and juries 
award punitive damages in about the same number of cases and in about the same amounts). 
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Court of Appeals in McPherson v. Buick/8 which gave rise to our modem 
product liability doctrines by abandoning archaic privity requirements and 
extending principles of strict liability to consumer products. If the liability 
rules created in McPherson were out touch with mainstream public views 
about corporate accountability, then juries would not have accepted them, 
and Cardozo's opinion would be forgotten, an island in the stream of 
justice. It is this dynamic-the constant revalidation of liability rules by 
juries-that gives the common-law system its enduring strength and 
legitimacy. 39 
I close by coming full circle. Professors Rosenberg and Fried urge a 
wholesale restructuring of our current tort system by advocating that 
liability rules be established in advance, through legislation or preemptive 
regulatory action, not after the fact, through ad hoc liability determinations 
made by juries. As a matter of theory, their ideas have great power. But it 
is hard to see as a practical matter how their theory could be effectively 
implemented. Consider asbestos litigation. Assume that people of good 
faith had sat down in 1925 (or 1975) and tried to develop a rational set of 
liability rules to govern claims by individuals and companies alleging 
injury due to asbestos exposure. Was there sufficient information available 
at the time to write liability rules in a fair and even-handed way? Would 
we have been well served by legislating fixed, hard to change liability rules 
in 1925? In 1975? The answer, of course, is "no." The more we have 
learned about asbestos exposure, and the behavior of the companies that 
manufactured and sold asbestos products,40 the more our law has adapted to 
38 217N.Y.382(1916). 
39 For this reason, critics of the common-law system who isolate individual jury awards 
for condemnation miss the point. Roundtable, Redressing Harm: Who Decides?, 31 SETON 
HALL L. REv. 644, 644 (2001). To be sure, juries occasionally reach the wrong conclusions, 
or may be too free with the defendant's money and over-compensate the plaintiff. For that 
reason, trial judges and appellate courts are empowered to set aside jury verdicts that depart 
from the evidence or the law. But jury error is a two-way street. There are doubtless 
occasions where juries render pro-defense verdicts that are wrong, or under-compensate 
injured parties. The authors' suggestion that juries tend to over- rather than under-
compensate is, at the least, highly contestable, and is certainly not borne out by the available 
evidence. Viewed in the aggregate, however, jury verdicts establish liability rules that 
accurately reflect the views of Americans. That is the enduring strength of the common-law 
system. 
40 The conduct of asbestos companies in concealing information about the hazards of 
asbestos exposure has played a pivotal role in liability determinations. Yet another example 
has recently come to light. According to a recent press account, the W.R. Grace Company 
engaged in a thirty year long campaign to suppress information that its fire-retardant 
"Monokote," marketed as a safe substitute for asbestos products, was in fact laced with 
substantial amounts of tremolite, a little-known but equally deadly form of asbestos. 
Michael Moss & Adrianne Appel, Protecting the Product: A Special Report-Company's 
Silence Countered Safety Fears About Asbestos, N.Y. TIMES, July 9,2001, at AI. Liability 
rules must be sufficiently flexible to enable any trier of fact to take into account this sort of 
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impose liability where it belongs.41 
I agree with Professors Rosenberg and Fried that information is 
indeed the sine qua non of fair and efficient standard setting. But that fact 
argues in favor of retaining the common-law system that can respond 
swiftly and flexibly to new information, not to fixed rules of liability that 
may quickly become outdated and thus serve as barriers to justice. 
perfidious conduct-which is yet another factor that counsels in favor of the retention of the 
common law system. 
41 I recognize that at some point, the knowledge base becomes mature, and that 
legislative rules can reasonably be set by Congress or another legislative body. But that 
recognition hardly satisfies Professors Rosenberg and Fried, who advocate setting liability 
rules far earlier in the process. Moreover, this discussion assumes away the problem that 
legislative efforts to establish liability rules are inevitably subject to intense political and 
special interest pressures-factors that have thus far foreclosed congressional action on 
proposed asbestos liability legislation. See, e.g., Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act of 
1998, H.R. 3905, J05th Congo (1998) (sponsored by House Judiciary Committee Chairman, 
Henry Hyde); S. 2546, J05th Congo (1998) (sponsored by Senate Judiciary Committee 
Chairman Orrin Hatch). See generally CHARLES LEWIS, THE BlNING OF THE CONGRESS: 
How SPECIAL INTERESTS HAVE STOLEN YOUR RIGHT TO LIFE, LIBERTY AND THE PURSUIT OF 
HAPPINESS 1-12 (1998). 
